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Non-technical summary
Collective models of household consumption and labor supply behavior
allow the representation of individual behavior inside the household. By con-
trast, the more widely used unitary models consider household behavior as
resulting from the decisions of a single individual, occulting the fact that most
households are composed of several individuals who take part in the decision
processes, and thus precluding the analysis of intra-familial redistribution of
household resources. For a model of allocation of leisure and consumption of
an aggregate good, Chiappori (1988, 1992) has shown that simply assuming
Pareto efficient allocations implies a set of restrictions on the labor supply
functions, and that these are sufficient to identify the individual preferences
and an income sharing rule up to an additive constant. The basic model
has been extended in several directions, including household production and
children, and the presence of more than two decision makers in the house-
hold. Empirically relevant discrete decisions, such as non participation of
one of the household’s members, introduce further difficulties. Even in that
case, complete identification (up to an additive constant) has been shown for
collective models with a convex budget set.
Yet vast research efforts remain necessary for the implementation of col-
lective models in all situations where unitary models are used in practice, in
particular in the presence of non-convex budget sets, and for modeling in-
tertemporal allocations. The aim of the present study is to assess the poten-
tial returns of such a research program, by comparing collective and unitary
models on the basis of simulated collective data with income taxation. By
simulating data from the collective model we circumvent the difficulties that
are still connected with its estimation, but we are able to point out the many
distortions created by the use of a unitary model. We focus on the analysis
of tax reforms because this type of exercise often motivates the estimation
of household preference parameters. We distinguish the cases of individual
and joint taxation. Estimating the unitary model we obtain strikingly dif-
ferent ‘preference’ parameters depending on the type of taxation. We also
obtain substantial differences between predicted adjustments to labor supply
following a switch between tax regimes, and hence potentially wide-ranging
definitions of revenue-neutral versions of tax reforms: our results show that
even the design of revenue-neutral reforms may be heavily distorted by the
use of a unitary model on collective data. Finally we discuss distortions af-
fecting the welfare analysis of reforms on the basis of unitary estimates when
the model generating the data is a collective model. The results suggest that
increased efforts should be devoted to the estimation of collective models
with taxation.
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Abstract
Several recent papers have shown the relevance of collective models
for the empirical investigation of household labor supply and con-
sumption. Yet the estimation of collective models in the presence of
non-linear budget sets and participation decisions remains a daunting
task. This paper compares collective and unitary models on the ba-
sis of simulated collective data with income taxation. We distinguish
the cases of individual and joint taxation. Estimating the unitary
model we obtain strikingly different ‘preference’ parameters depend-
ing on the type of taxation. We also obtain substantial differences
between predicted adjustments to labor supply following a switch be-
tween tax regimes, and hence potentially wide-ranging definitions of
revenue-neutral versions of tax reforms. Finally we discuss distor-
tions affecting the welfare analysis of reforms on the basis of unitary
estimates when the model generating the data is a collective model.
The results suggest that increased efforts should be devoted to the
estimation of collective models with taxation.
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1 Introduction
Collective models of household consumption and labor supply behavior, in-
troduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988), allow the
representation of individual behavior inside the household. By contrast, the
more widely used unitary models consider household behavior as resulting
from the decisions of a single individual, occulting the fact that most house-
holds are composed of several individuals who take part in the decision pro-
cesses. This precludes the analysis of intra-familial redistribution of house-
hold resources. Unitary models treat the family as a black box, so that the
income distribution inside the family cannot be reconstructed (see e.g. Lech-
ene, 1993). The main difficulty with the unitary models concerns aggregation
of preferences (see Arrow, 1951 and Hildenbrand, 1994) and of individual de-
mands (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Although Samuelson’s consensus
idea (1956) and Becker’s altruistic model (1991) generate consensual behavior
for as regards resource allocation within the family, the underlying assump-
tions have been criticized as highly restrictive (see e.g. Ben Porath, 1982,
and Bergstrom, 1989); indeed allocations within the household may well be
conflictual (see Sen, 1984).
For a model of allocation of leisure and consumption of an aggregate good,
Chiappori (1988, 1992) shows that his definition of collective rationality,
which imposes Pareto efficient allocations, implies a set of restrictions on the
labor supply functions, and that these are sufficient to identify the individual
preferences and the income sharing rule up to an additive constant. These
conditions consist in a set of restrictions on the partial differentials of the
labor supply functions .
The basic model has been extended in several directions, including house-
hold production and children (Apps and Rees, 1996, 1997, 1999, Chiappori,
1997, Chiuri, 1999 and Bourguignon, 1999), and the presence of more than
two decision makers in the household (Browning and Chiappori, 1998). Em-
pirically relevant discrete decisions, such as non participation of one of the
household’s members, introduce further difficulties. Even in that case, com-
plete identification (up to an additive constant) has been shown for collective
models with a linear budget constraint (Blundell et al., 1998) and with a con-
vex budget set (Donni, 2000, and Beninger, 2000). More details concerning
the literature on collective models can be found in the excellent survey of
Vermeulen (2002).
Yet vast research efforts remain necessary for the implementation of col-
lective models in all situations where unitary models are used in practice,
in particular in the presence of non-convex budget sets, and for modeling
intertemporal allocations. The aim of the present study is to assess the
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potential returns of such a research program: by simulating data from the
collective model we circumvent the difficulties that are still connected with
its estimation, but we are able to point out the many distortions created by
the use of a unitary model. The reason why we do not perform the symmetric
exercise of simulating unitary data and analyzing distortions from the use of
collective is twofold. Firstly, as already mentioned, estimating a collective
will be difficult (unless we take into account the fact that the data have been
generated by a unitary model), and secondly, it is the unitary model which
is regularly rejected in the empirical literature, and this in itself justifies our
asymmetric treatment. We focus on the analysis of tax reforms because this
type of exercise often motivates the estimation of household preference pa-
rameters. Our results show that even the design of revenue-neutral reforms
may be heavily distorted by the use of a unitary model on collective data.
In Section 2, we briefly present the two models. In Section 3 we explain
how the simulated data sets are generated, and these are described in Sec-
tion 4. The econometric specification of the estimated unitary model, which
draws on van Soest (1995) is discussed in Section 5. Estimation and policy
simulation results are discussed in Section 6, with four subsections present-
ing the estimates, their use in predicting labor supplies, and the positive and
normative analysis of tax reforms, respectively.
2 The representation of household behavior
In this section we briefly present unitary and collective models of allocation
of leisure and consumption of an aggregate good at the household level.
2.1 Unitary models
Unitary models assume that the household maximizes a unique utility func-
tion, independent of prices and incomes. They also assume the pooling of
family incomes. Thus, for these models, the allocations are deduced from the
maximization of a utility function under budget and time constraints:



max
cf ,lf ,cm,lm
U (cf , lf , cm, lm) ,
cf + cm ≤ g (lf , lm, wf , wm, y) ,
0 ≤ T − li ≤ H ∀ i = f,m,
(1)
where ci, li, wi, y, H and T represent respectively i’s (i = f,m, for wife and
husband, respectively) consumption, leisure demand and gross wage rate, the
couple’s unearned income, the maximum work time and the total time in a
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week.1 Function g (.), which describes the tax system, is assumed to generate
convex budget sets.2 The utility function U (.) is increasing in its arguments
and quasi-concave.
With the unitary model, the intra-household distribution of resources
plays no role. Yet the question of intra-familial redistribution of incomes can
be crucial in determining household choices (see e.g. Lundberg et al., 1996)
and answers are important if institutions want to conduct efficient and fair
economic and social policies (see e.g. Haddad and Kanbur, 1990). Collective
models can offer such answers.
2.2 Collective models
In these models, consumptions choices are derived by assuming only Pareto-
optimality of allocations, and this single a priori assumption defines the col-
lective rationality concept used. Following Chiappori (1988), we focus on the
case where individuals’ preferences are egoistic (each spouse’s utility is only
defined on own consumption and leisure). In that case, and for a linear house-
hold budget restriction, household behavior can be represented sequentially,
using an explicit sharing rule for the unearned income. Chiappori shows
that individual preferences and the sharing rule are identified from observ-
able behavior, up to a constant. The extension to the case of non linear,
but convex, budget sets has been introduced by Donni (2000): for egoistic
individuals the individual preferences and the unearned income sharing rule
can still be identified up to an additive constant.3
In the case of egoistic preferences, collective models with convex budget
sets have the following centralized representation:



max
cf ,lf ,cm,lm
U f (cf , lf) + λ (.)Um (cm, lm) ,
cf + cm ≤ g (lf , lm, wf , wm, y) ,
0 ≤ T − li ≤ H ∀ i = f,m,
(2)
where λ (.) = λ (wf , wm, y) represents the relative weight of the husband.4
Alternatively, the sequential representation is:5
1The maximum number of hours of work was introduced for numerical reasons, but it
could be justified by the existence of legal constraints.
2While this restriction can easily be relaxed for the unitary model, this is not (yet) the
case for the collective model.
3See also Beninger (2000).
4If λ is constant, model (2) is a special case of a unitary model, with separability in
the partition (cf , lf ), (cm, lm).
5See Chiappori, 1992 and Apps and Rees, 1988, for the linear case, and Donni, 2000,
for the convex case.
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


max
ci,li
U i (ci, li) ,
ci ≤ w˜i (T − li) + y˜i,
0 ≤ T − li ≤ H ∀ i = f,m,
(3)
where w˜i is i’s implicit (or shadow) wage at the optimum
³
c∗f , l
∗
f , c
∗
m, l
∗
m
´
:
w˜i = gli
³
l∗f , l
∗
m, wf , wm, y
´
, (4)
with gx = ∂g/∂x. If we define the household’s implicit unearned income, y˜,
as:
y˜ = g
³
l∗f , l
∗
m, wf , wm, y
´
−
X
i=f,m
w˜i (T − l∗i ) , (5)
there exists an implicit income sharing rule which determines y˜f as y˜f =
Υ˜ (w˜f , w˜m, y˜), such that the sequential representation (3) is equivalent to the
centralized form (4) of the model. The equivalence can be shown with the
implicit functions theorem.
In our simulations, the implicit income sharing rule Υ˜ (.) will be related
to the effective sharing rule which the spouses use to share gross unearned
income. This sharing rule is defined as
Υ : (wf , wm, y) 7−→ yf/y, (6)
where yf denotes the wife’s share of gross unearned income.
3 Simulation of collective data
Data were generated from the following specification of the sequential repre-
sentation (3) of the collective model:6



max
ci,li
U i (ci, li) ,
ci ≤ gi (lf , lm, wf , wm, y) ,
0 ≤ T − li ≤ H ∀ i = f,m,
(7)
where gi (lf , lm, wf , wm, y) ≡ w˜i (T − li) + y˜i. The chosen functional form for
the individual utility functions is:
U i (ci, li) = ki log (ci − c¯) + (1− ki) log li, (8)
6The justification for preferring the sequential representation in this exercise is that it
computationally simpler, especially for the cases of absence of taxation and of individual
taxation, described later in this section.
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where ki denotes the marginal propensity to consume, and c¯ is a minimum
level of consumption, assumed identical for all individuals.7
To describe precisely how the simulations were done, we need to explain
how all variables and parameters needed to compute optimal allocations on
the basis of (7) and (8) are generated or set, and to specify the budget
constraints gi. Parameter settings and variable generation are described in
Appendix A.
In order to specify the budget constraint in (7), we first define the shar-
ing rule for gross unearned income (equation (6)). We assume that gross
unearned income is shared in proportion to gross wages:
Υ (wf , wm, y) =
yf
y
=
wf
wf + wm
. (9)
This choice is motivated, with drastic simplifications, by results from several
empirical studies (see e.g. Bourguignon et al., 1994). Refining the shar-
ing rule by letting it depend on actual unearned incomes would probably
strengthen the distortions due to the use of the unitary representation, be-
cause of its implication of income pooling. However it turns out that the
simple choice made here suffices to produce evidence of substantial distor-
tions. Another refinement that would increase distortions would make the
sharing rule explicitly depend on the tax system. This kind of approach is
taken up in the papers gathered in Laisney (2002).
Next we turn to the tax system. In the absence of taxation (linear budget
constraint), we have:
gi (.) = wi (T − li) + yi, ∀ i = f,m. (10)
In the case of personal taxation (each spouse taxed individually) with a
piece-wise linear progressive tax schedule, i’s disposable income (i = f,m)
is:
gpi (.) =
s−1X
k=1
³
1− τ kp
´ ³
Sk+1p − Skp
´
+
³
1− τ sp
´ ³
Rpi − Ssp
´
, (11)
where Rpi is i’s gross income: R
p
i = wi. (T − l
p
i )+ yi. Vector τp =
³
τ1p, ..., τ
tp
p
´
is the vector of marginal tax rates and Sp =
³
S1p , ..., S
tp
p
´
is the corresponding
vector of tax brackets for individual taxation. There are tp tax brackets and
s represents the bracket for which Ssp ≤ R
p
i < S
s+1
p if s < tq and S
s
p ≤ R
p
i if
s = tp. In that case, the assumptions made imply complete separation of the
problems solved by the two spouses.
7Without the introduction of c¯, preferences would be homothetic, a restriction which
is universally empirically rejected.
7
In the case of common or joint taxation with a piece-wise linear progres-
sive taxation rule, i’s disposable income is:
gci (.) = wi (T − lci ) + yi − Ici , ∀ i = f,m, (12)
where Ici is i’s contribution to the total tax liability I
c of the household,
where the latter is given by:
Ic (.) =
s−1X
k=1
τ kc
³
Sk+1c − Skc
´
+ τ sc (R
c − Ssc) , (13)
where Rc =
P
iwi. (T − lci ) + y is household gross income and the notations
for the tax brackets and marginal tax rates are similar to the case of per-
sonal taxation. We assume that the tax liability of the household is shared
proportionately to gross incomes, i.e. Ici /I
c = Rci/R
c. This assumption is
arbitrary but it is the most convenient rule we could think of.
The numerical values we choose for the tax parameters are: τp = τ c =
(0, .3, .5), Sp = (0, 5000, 10000) and Sc = (0, 7800, 15000), so as to ensure
revenue neutrality (approximately).8
The collective model thus defined is perfectly deterministic. It is not clear
to us whether or not this feature systematically puts the unitary model in
a more disadvantageous situation than if some noise had been introduced in
the model.
4 Simulated collective data sets
We have generated data for 2000 couples in three different cases: no taxation,
joint taxation and individual taxation. Each individual is characterized by
an observed heterogeneity factor, the marginal propensity to consume, and
has a budget constraint gi (lf , lm, wf , wm, y) which depends on the tax system
and on the sharing rule Υ and has as arguments both leisure demands, both
gross wage rates and household unearned income.9 Given these functions, the
optimal labor supply and consumption of each spouse is computed for each
tax situation by solving (7) for each household, with real-valued solutions,
using Mathematica 4.0. A summary of the results is given in Table 1, and a
more complete description is given in Appendix B.
8All magnitude pertain to a week, except the hourly wage rate.
9Sine we have drawn the wages of husband and wife independently, there is no assor-
tative mating in these data sets.
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Table 1: Simulated data (means)
variable symbol no tax. joint tax. indiv. tax.
her work hours hf 46.8 39.6 42.8
his work hours hm 45.8 38.6 40.7
household cons. c 13,730 10,695 11,026
her wage wf 77.3
his wage wm 102.3
unearned income y 5,054
Regardless of the tax situation, the wife’s labor supply, hf , is on average a
little higher than the husband’s, hm. This is not what is observed for childless
couples in typical data sets, and a more complex specification of the sharing
rule, or the specification of different preferences for males and females, would
probably allow us to come up with simulated data more closely mimicking
established stylized facts. Note that here the only difference between hus-
bands and wives is that men have on average higher wages, which translates
into a higher share of unearned income, and thus into lower labor supply,
given that leisure is a normal good in the preferences considered.
When the individuals are not taxed, women are more likely to prefer
a part-time job (about 20 hours weekly), or to work overtime. Men are
slightly more likely to work an ‘average’ number of hours (30 to 40 weekly
hours). But despite the wage differential, the distribution of labor supply is
roughly the same for both sexes. Compared to real data for most countries,
labor supply here is rather high, with a majority of individuals working
between 30 and 70 hours per week. About 7% do not participate: these
are essentially individuals with a high level of unearned income. individuals
with a high marginal propensity to consume are under-represented among
non participants.
The introduction of taxation has a large disincentive impact, but this
varies with individual and household characteristics. individuals with high
wages and high unearned income are more affected, while the poorest are not
affected at all.
In the specific case of the introduction of individual taxation, consider
two identical women (same marginal propensity to consume, same wage and
household unearned income), but assume that their husbands are endowed
with different wages. The woman whose husband has the lower wage supports
a larger disincentive effect than the other one, because of the specification of
the income sharing rule.
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Figure 1: Weekly hours of work.
In the case of joint taxation the disincentive effect is even larger, and again,
better endowed individuals are more affected. The new aspect here is that, in
case of a large wage gap between the spouses, the poorer one will also reduce
his or her labor supply: a comparatively low wage rate implies inequality on
two accounts within the household: as regards wage income wi (T − li), and
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as regards the sharing of unearned income yi. Joint taxation is relatively
unfavorable to the less well endowed spouse, as the latter bears part of the
tax burden of the richer spouse. Again, individuals with a high marginal
propensity to consume are more affected than others.
The fact that joint taxation has a larger disincentive effect than individual
taxation does not result from differences in tax revenue: the tax brackets have
been specified in such a way that tax revenues are virtually identical in both
situations (see Section 3 and Appendix D). In fact, it turns out that joint
taxation is more favorable for households than individual taxation: for the
tax parameters used here and for identical gross income (labor supplies and
unearned income fixed), a couple pays more tax in the case of individual
taxation than in the case of joint taxation (about 25% more). However, joint
taxation is relatively more favorable to the richer spouse (see Section 6.4).
We now examine more specifically the impact of different variables and
parameters on reactions to the introduction of one type of taxation or the
other, and begin with household unearned income, y. As leisure is a normal
good for each individual, leisure demand li (i = f,m) will increase with y.
However, in the case of joint taxation there are other effects at work, because
there is a degree of interdependence in the behavior of the spouses. It then
becomes difficult to say a priori what the impact of a change in y will be.
The effect of a change in the wage rate wi on labor supply hi is even
more ambiguous, as it depends on the other characteristics of the individual
(marginal propensity to consume, spouse’s wage and household unearned in-
come). Yet our simulated data show generally a negative association between
wages and labor supply. This is due to the fact that the income effect of a
change in the wage is reinforced by the corresponding change in the individ-
ual’s share of unearned income. In particular, individuals with the lowest
wages often have a relatively high labor supply. Still, a clear effect is that an
increase in wi (i = f,m) has a negative impact on the spouse’s labor supply
hj (j = f,m, j 6= i), because of the specification of the sharing rule (9).
Of course, an increase in the marginal propensity to consume ki induces
individuals to work more.
The impact of changes in parameter values on ci are less ambiguous.
There is a positive impact of y, wi and ki on ci. By contrast, wj (j = f,m,
j 6= i) has a negative impact through the sharing rule. And, almost needless
to say, introducing taxation has a negative effect on consumption.
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5 Econometric specification of unitary model
For the unitary model, we use the specification of van Soest (1995) and
adopt his discrete choice approach, as this is well adapted to the estimation
of preference parameters in the presence of non linear budget constraints.
The household utility function has the direct translog form:
Uˆ (v) = v0Av + b0v, (14)
where v = (log c, log lf , log lm) ≡ (lc, llf , llm), and Uˆ (.) represents the house-
hold’s utility function. The 3×3 matrix A = ({αij}) , i,j = c,f,m, is sym-
metric, and b = ({βi}) - i = c, f,m, where c, f,m are associated respectively
to lc, llf and llm is a vector of parameters. Consumption c results from the
leisure choices through the budget constraint:
c = g (lf , lm, wf , wm, y) .
Moreover, we can add to the model some heterogeneity factors representing
observed characteristics of the individual agents or the household. This in-
clusion of observable heterogeneity in the model will be done by allowing b to
depend linearly on observed characteristics. Here we will introduce only one
type of observed heterogeneity, connected with the existence of three possible
values for the marginal propensity to consume (see Appendix A). This will
take the form of two series of three dummies, one for the wife, and one for
the husband.
We assume that each individual has n = 11 possible choices for his or her
weekly labor supply: hi = T -l i = 0,10,. . .,100. This yields a set of N = 121
choices for the leisure demand pairs (lf , lm) of the spouses. If Uˆ
³
lcj , lljf , ll
j
m
´
denotes the utility generated by combination
³
cj , ljf , l
j
m
´
, adding an error
term εj, we define actual utility derived from combination j as:
Uˆj = Uˆ
³
lcj , lljf , ll
j
m
´
+ εj ∀ j = 1, ..., N. (15)
Specifying the extreme value distribution for εj, defined by:
Pr [εj < ε] = exp (− exp (−ε)) , (16)
leads to the multinomial logit model:
Pr
h
Uˆj > Uˆk, ∀ k 6= j
i
=
exp
³
Uˆ
³
cj , ljf , l
j
m
´´
PN
k=1 exp
³
Uˆ
³
ck, lkf , l
k
m
´´ . (17)
Expression (17) represents the household’s contribution to the likelihood.
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In the absence of unobserved heterogeneity in the data, there would only
be marginal returns to the estimation of more refined specifications allowing
for such heterogeneity, such as some version of the mixed multinomial of
McFadden and Train (2000) or the heterogeneity augmented logit model of
Chesher and Santos Silva (2002). Similarly, including fixed costs of work
along the lines of Gong and van Soest (2002) would appear artificial, as no
such costs are present in the data.
The following restrictions should be satisfied:
−Uˆ−1c
Ã
clf 1 0
clm 0 1
!
HUˆ


clf clm
1 0
0 1

 > 0, (18)
where Uˆx =
∂Uˆ
∂x
, cx = −
Uˆx
Uˆc
, HUˆ =
n
Uˆx,y
o
=
(
∂2Uˆ
∂x∂y
)
with x, y = c, lf , lm.
This restriction is a consequence of the quasi-concavity of the household
utility function and of the fact that Uˆ is increasing in c (see. e.g. van Soest
et al., 1990). This last assumption is verified if:
2 (αcclc + αfcllf + αmcllm) + βc > 0. (19)
Similar monotonicity restrictions apply w.r.t. the other arguments of Uˆ .
6 Results
In this section we first give the estimation results for the unitary models,
and the predictions of the labor supplies based on these estimates. We then
perform the analysis of the different fiscal reforms, using the two type of
models considered, and stress differences in positive and normative aspects
of the corresponding evaluation.
6.1 Estimation of unitary models
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the utility function spe-
cified in Section 5, and based on equation (17), are given in Appendix C.
Estimation was conducted in the three cases ‘absence of taxation’, ‘joint tax-
ation’ and ‘individual taxation’, yielding three vectors of estimates denoted
θˆ
o
, θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
, respectively. Following van Soest, we decided to interact the
dummies describing the marginal propensity to consume of each spouse only
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with that individual’s leisure demand. The estimates differ significantly.10
It is important to stress this point: as the individual underlying preferences
are unchanged throughout this exercise, estimation results at the level of the
household should in principle be fairly similar in all three situations. The fact
that estimates for household preference parameters are affected by the form
of the household budget constraint results solely from the misspecification
embodied in the unitary representation of collective households.
The estimated coefficients βi, i = c, lf , lm, differ considerably depending
on the data set used — and thus on the tax system. The coefficients of leisure
demand are all significant in one case only, that of individual taxation. The
signs of significant β coefficients for joint taxation agree with those for and
individual taxation. But all significant β coefficients for labor supply in the
absence of taxation are positive, whereas they are negative for individual
taxation. The coefficient βˆc is strongly and significantly negative in all cases,
but its magnitude doubles when going from absence of taxation to individual
taxation, with the value for joint taxation in-between. Note that, even if the
linear impact of consumption on utility (when the household is not taxed)
is strongly negative, the overall effect of consumption on household utility is
positive for almost all observations: condition (19) is satisfied, except for a
few households where both spouses have a very large labor supply (connected
with low wages and unearned income) especially in the case of individual
taxation. The situation as regards labor supplies is less favorable, though.
Quadratic effects, both direct and cross effects, all significant in all three
estimations, are a little more stable w.r.t. the tax system, as no sign rever-
sals appear here. The direct effects (coefficients αii) concerning leisure have
similar magnitudes, although they are a little weaker in the case of individual
taxation. Coefficient αcc is more sensitive to the tax system, and the same
holds for cross effects (coefficients αij, with i 6= j), especially the cross effects
consumption-leisure demand. Estimation results concerning the quadratic
effects are fairly similar to those obtained with real data (see for example
van Soest, 1995, for Dutch data, and Wolf, 1998, for German data). The
restriction of quasi concavity of the utility function (18) is satisfied for most
observations in each case.
10Admittedly, a more thorough comparison of estimation results could focus on marginal
effects combining the linear and quadratic coefficients. However, the differences we note
as large enough for us to dispense with that further step.
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6.2 Predictions with unitary models
These estimates can be used to make predictions of labor supplies, obtained
by computing choice probabilities on the basis of equation (17) and taking
the category with the highest choice probability as the chosen one.
Actual versus predicted labour supplies (women)
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Actual versus predicted labour supplies (women)
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Actual versus predicted labour supplies (women)
- individual taxation
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted weekly hours of work.
Note: predicted labor supplies 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the use of parameter
vectors θˆ
o
, θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
, respectively.
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Predicted labor supplies have a lower dispersion than effective labor supplies,
and a more symmetric distribution (see Figures 2 for women; similar results
are obtained for men).11 In particular the number of non-working individuals
is under-estimated in all cases and for all predictions. The estimation of
household labor supply on the basis of real-world data (see for instance van
Soest, 1995) also indicates an over-estimation of the participation rates. Van
Soest argues that this phenomenon may result from the endogeneity of wage
rates and from characteristics of the demand side of the labor market, and
proposes a correction taking account of restrictions on hours. But here wages
are perfectly exogenous and known for all agents, and labor supply is not
constrained in any way. Thus the over-estimation of participation rates does
not result from the neglect of institutional factors in the specification.
Predictions obtained with estimated coefficients θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
tend to under-
estimate labor supplies (except predictions using θˆ
p
in the case of joint tax-
ation). The under-estimation is larger when θˆ
c
is used. Predictions based on
θˆ
o
over-estimate part-time work and under-estimate ‘overtime’. Yet all vec-
tors θˆ are meant to estimate the same preference parameters, and predictions
obtained with these vectors should not be too dissimilar.
The predictions look better when the coefficient vector used corresponds
to the situation described (for example using θˆ
c
to predict labor supplies
in the case of joint taxation), in the sense that more agents have identical
predicted and actual labor supplies .
6.3 Analysis of fiscal reforms: positive aspects
Tables 2 and 3 show that the adjustment of labor supplies following the
introduction of taxation is also poorly predicted using the unitary model, es-
pecially in the case of joint taxation. For example, with the unitary model at
least 110 women are predicted to offer unchanged numbers of hours, whereas
they actually reduce their weekly labor supply by 10 hours or more after
the introduction of joint taxation, and more women are predicted to keep
their labor supply unchanged than is actually the case (see Table 2). The
reduction in hours offered after the introduction of any type of taxation is
underestimated by the unitary models.
Tables 2 and 3 also show that predictions obtained with coefficients θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
are sightly worse than those obtained with θˆ
o
, especially when θˆ
p
is
used to predict the effect of introducing joint taxation and θˆ
c
is used for
individual taxation.
11In the comparisons, we have discretised the collective labour supplies.
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Table 2: Effect of the introduction of joint taxation
unitary versus collective model (women)
≤-30 -20 -10 0 total
-10 3 43 406 143 595
0 10 106 718 562 1396
10 0 4 0 5 9
total 13 153 1124 710 2000
1. using estimates θˆ
o
≤-30 -20 -10 0 total
≤-10 3 49 381 111 545
0 10 96 738 591 1435
≥10 0 8 5 7 20
total 13 153 1124 710 2000
2. using estimates θˆ
c
≤-30 -20 -10 0 total
≤-10 6 38 347 110 501
0 7 109 770 589 1475
≥10 0 6 7 11 24
total 13 153 1124 710 2000
3. using estimates θˆ
p
Notes: columns show the actual change in labor supply when joint (resp. individ-
ual) taxation is introduced, rows show corresponding predicted changes using the
unitary model, in the three versions θˆ
o
, θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
. Diagonal in bold.
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Table 3: Effect of the introduction of individual taxation
unitary versus collective model (women)
-20 -10 0 10 total
-10 19 209 184 2 414
0 44 473 1010 0 1527
10 2 3 54 0 59
total 65 685 1248 2 2000
1. using estimates θˆ
o
-20 -10 0 10 total
-10 18 212 139 1 370
0 47 465 1028 1 1541
≥10 0 8 81 0 89
total 65 685 1248 2 2000
2. using estimates θˆ
c
-20 -10 0 10 total
-10 19 205 117 2 343
0 45 468 1000 0 1513
≥10 1 12 131 0 144
total 65 685 1248 2 2000
3. using estimates θˆ
p
Notes: columns show the actual change in labor supply when joint (resp. individ-
ual) taxation is introduced, rows show corresponding predicted changes using the
unitary model, in the three versions θˆ
o
, θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
. Diagonal in bold.
6.4 Analysis of fiscal reforms: normative aspects
We begin with the tax reform analysis based on the collective model. Figures
3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of individual welfare gains, here negative,
by decile of the distribution of gross income in the baseline situation without
taxation. As expected in the absence of redistribution of tax revenues, the
introduction of taxation has a negative impact on welfare. Yet agents with
low incomes do not incur losses when individual taxation is introduced, as
they are not taxed at all. But some of them are affected by the introduction
of joint taxation: their spouse is rich enough for the couple to be taxed.
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the welfare consequences of the move from in-
dividual to joint taxation, for men and women. The fact that individual
taxation is relatively more advantageous than joint taxation for low income
individuals is confirmed. By contrast, high income agents are relatively bet-
ter off with joint taxation, because it allows them to share the burden of
taxation with the less well endowed spouse. Individual taxation is thus rel-
atively more interesting for women, as their wage rates are on average 20%
lower than men’s.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles
-400
-300
-200
-100
gains figure 3.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles
-400
-300
-200
-100
gains figure 3.2
no tax→ joint taxation (men) no tax→ individual taxation (men)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles
-200
-100
100
200
gains figure 3.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles
-200
-100
100
200
gains figure 3.4
individual taxation→ joint taxation
women men
Figures 3: gains in individual utility for different fiscal reforms
collective model
Notes: the figures represent mean utility gains by decile of the pre-reform gross
individual income distribution for the introduction of joint taxation (Figure 3.1),
individual taxation (Figure 3.2) and for the move from individual taxation to joint
taxation (Figures 3.3 and 3.4), for women (Figure 3.3) and men (Figures 3.1, 3.2
and 3.4). The vertical lines show the range of gains, the rectangles show inter-
quartiles intervals, the solid line shows average gains, and the dotted lines show
confidence intervals (± twice the standard error of the mean).
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Table 4 shows that in terms of welfare, 62% of the women gain in the move
from joint to individual taxation, and some 20% are indifferent. The remain-
ing 18% prefer joint taxation . By contrast, more men prefer joint taxation
(about 36%), 17% are indifferent and the rest (47%) gains from individual
taxation.
Moreover, there are relatively few couples for which the direction of the
relative advantage of each fiscal system is identical for both partners. This
‘conflictual’ situation is essentially due to the wage rate differential and the
ensuing difference in incomes: the richer partner finds joint taxation advan-
tageous. For only 42% of the couples both partners fall in the same category
(winner, loser, indifferent) in the switch between the two systems. These are
partly households whose members are indifferent to each tax system anyway,
as their incomes are too low to be taxed.
Descriptive statistics on the subsamples of winners and losers (not shown
here in order to gain space) indicate that the marginal propensity to con-
sume has an important impact on the welfare effects of the fiscal systems.
Winners from joint taxation have on average a higher marginal propensity
to consume. By contrast, household unearned income has no notable impact
on the relative advantage of one system over the other in terms of the sign
of welfare changes.
We now turn to the welfare impact of the reforms as described on the ba-
sis of the unitary models. Figures 4 show the distribution of household utility
gains by decile of the distribution of gross household income in the baseline
situation without taxation, with utility gains computed from the unitary
models.12 Results concerning the introduction of taxation (joint or individ-
ual) are not in conflict with those obtained with the collective representation
of the household. However, results apparently diverge as regards the move
from individual to joint taxation: whereas the richest individuals were mostly
winners for the collective model, the majority of the richest households lose.
This impression will be tempered when we look at individuals in households.
These results are described in Table 4, which compares the qualitative
welfare effects (gain, loss, indifference) of the move from individual to joint
taxation, and of the inverse move, as predicted by both models. Note that
both panels of Table 4 are not exactly symmetrical: the number of households
losing in the move from individual to joint taxation should in principle coin-
cide with the number of winners in the reverse move, whatever the estimate
θˆ used. This asymmetry results from the more pronounced under-estimation
of labor supplies with θˆ
c
than with θˆ
p
. For about 100 households (5%), the
predicted qualitative welfare effects are contradictory, in the sense that, in
12The parameter used corresponds in each case to the initial tax system considered.
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the collective framework, at least one household member gains in a reform
and the partner does not lose, whereas using the unitary model the household
loses or is indifferent. For the majority of these, both spouses are indifferent
to the reform, whereas the household appears to lose in the unitary frame-
work: the discrepancy results from the poor quality of unitary predictions of
labor supply responses.
The ‘conflictual’ situation uncovered by the collective model is masked by
the unitary representation of household behavior.13 The relative advantage of
a tax system in the collective model is essentially linked to the intra-familial
income differential, and not only to total household income.
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-12
-10
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-6
-4
-2
gains figure 4.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
gains figure 4.2
no tax→ joint taxation no tax → individual taxation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles
-2
-1
1
2
gains figure 4.3
individual taxation→ joint taxation
Figures 4: household utility gains
for different fiscal reforms, unitary model
Note: the figures represent household utility gains by decile of the distribution of
pre-reform gross household income after the introduction of joint taxation (4.1),
individual taxation (4.2) and in the move from individual to joint taxation (4.3).
13See also the simple example of Brett (1998) showing that Pareto improving reforms
in a unitary setting are not necessarily Pareto improving in a collective setting (thanks to
Frederic Vermeulen for drawing our attention to that reference).
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Table 4: Joint and individual taxation:
comparison of the collective and unitary models
f+ f0 f−
m+ m0 m− m+ m0 m− m+ m0 m− total
hous+ 5 33 217 51 49 1 377 2 3 738
hous0 1 1 0 4 216 2 2 2 11 239
hous− 1 2 141 2 18 16 286 18 539 1023
total 7 36 358 57 283 19 665 22 553 2000
f− f0 f+
m− m0 m+ m− m0 m+ m− m0 m+ total
hous− 5 30 214 46 39 1 387 3 3 728
hous0 1 5 1 9 230 4 2 3 15 270
hous+ 1 1 143 2 14 14 276 16 535 1002
total 7 36 358 57 283 19 665 22 553 2000
total f 401 359 1240 2000
total m (m−) 729 (m0) 341 (m+) 930 2000
Notes: the first panel corresponds to the move from individual to joint taxation, the
second panel to the inverse move. Rows: winning (hous+), indifferent (hous0), and
losing households (hous−) on the basis of coefficients estimated in the departure
situation, i.e. θˆ
p
for the first panel and θˆ
c
for the second). Columns: winning
females (f+) and males (m+) — resp. f−, m− and f0, m0 for losers or indifferent
individuals, on the basis of the simulated collective data.
22
7 Conclusion
On the basis of data simulated for 2000 collective households in three different
fiscal situations, we have provided evidence on the distortions connected with
the use of estimates from a unitary model for the evaluation of fiscal reforms.
Firstly, the unitary model leads to fairly diverging estimates of household
‘preferences’ depending on the budget constraint faced by the households;
this is inasmuch problematic as these estimates are subsequently used as
truly reflecting preferences.
Secondly, even using for each reform the unitary estimates corresponding
to the departure situation, we find significant discrepancies in the prediction
of positive effects of fiscal reforms (adjustment in the labor supplies of the
spouses, and ex-ante computation of tax revenues). In particular, the latter
point shows that using a unitary representation may lead to non-negligible
errors in the design of revenue neutral reforms.
Finally, the comparison of the evaluation of welfare effects of fiscal re-
forms with the collective and unitary models reveals substantial divergences,
but also points to the deep differences in their foundation itself. Using a uni-
tary model leads the investigator to neglect resource allocations within the
household, and this may mask the fact that a reform that seems advanta-
geous for a majority of couples can in reality generate increased tensions and
inequality within a substantial number of households. Symmetrically, using
the collective model may lead to exaggerated emphasis on purely individual
aspects.
An important development of this study, namely to generate data in
a realistic way for different countries, taking account of the existing fiscal
systems and reforms under discussion, as well as of the structure and the
population, and to investigate how important the distortions illustrated here
may be for these different countries, is documented in Laisney (2002).
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8 Appendix A: parameters and variables
The parameter values are common to all individuals (like total available time,
for instance), the variables are particular to each individual (like gross wage
rates). In the latter case, the individual values result from i.i.d. sampling for
each individual (for wage rates and for the marginal propensities to consume)
and for each couple (unearned income).
8.1 Parameters
The fixed parameters, i.e. minimum consumption, c¯, total time available,
T , and maximal working time, H, are common to the whole population.
All pertain to a week. Minimum consumption per week is set to c¯ = 200
monetary units.14 Total time available, in hours, is the duration of a week
minus the time devoted to biological needs (sleeping, eating, etc.): T =
120 hours. This corresponds to the upper bound for leisure. The maximum
duration of work is set to H = 100 hours. Note that we do not consider any
domestic production in this model.
8.2 Variables
As mentioned above, these are the wage rates, unearned incomes andmarginal
propensities to consume.
Wage distributions are highly skewed to the right, and extremely low
wages are rare in the rich countries (see e.g. Hildenbrand, 1994 and 1998).
With these characteristics in mind, we specify the following density for the
wages:15
fwi (wi) =
wi
d2i
exp
µ
−wi
di
¶
1 (wi ≥ 0) ∀ i = f,m. (20)
The corresponding cumulative probability function is:
Fwi (wi) = 1 (wi ≥ 0)
Z wi
0
t
d2i
exp
µ
− t
di
¶
dt
= 1 (wi ≥ 0)
·
1−
µ
wi
di
+ 1
¶
exp
µ
−wi
di
¶¸ (21)
where df = 40 and dm = 50. Expectation, standard error and mode are
respectively E (wi) = 2di, σ (wi) = di
√
2, and mode(wi) = di. Figure A1
depicts the resulting wage distributions.
14We had French Francs per week in mind when setting monetary values, but the actual
units really are irrelevant.
15This is a special case of the Fisk distribution (see e.g. McDonald, 1984).
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Figure A1: Wage densities for men and women.
For unearned income we assume the exponential distribution:
fy (y) =
1
θ
exp
µ
−y
θ
¶
1 (y ≥ 0) , (22)
with θ = 5000. Expectation, standard error and mode are E (y) = σ (y) = θ,
and mode(y) = 0.
Individuals are assumed to have either a low marginal propensity to consume
(ki = .4), or a medium one (ki = .5) or a high one (ki = .6). Define β as a
realization of the Beta distribution B (2.6, 2.6) . We set:
ki = .4 if β ≤ .4
ki = .5 if .4 < β < .5
ki = .6 if β ≥ .6
.
These choices result in about a third of observations in each category, and
E (ki) = mode(ki) = .5, and σ (ki) = .08. The dummies ιi1, ιi2 and ιi3 take
value 1 if ki = .4, .5 or .6, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
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9 Appendix B: simulated data
Table A1: simulation results — no taxation
variable mean s.d. min. max.
exogenous variables
wf 77.3 55.0 2.0 425.3
wm 102.3 71.3 2.8 440.8
yf 2,205 2,711 1 20,627
ym 2,850 3,706 1 52,56
y 5,055 5,460 2 56,310
choice variables, no taxation
cf 5,972 4,115 218 29,931
cm 7,758 5,331 291 52,567
c 13,730 6,404 1,863 56,310
hf 46.8 19.7 0 100
hm 45.8 19.6 0 89
lf 73.2 19.7 20 120
lm 74.2 19.6 31 120
choice variables, joint tax.
cf 4,693 2,856 218 18,134
cm 6,001 3,474 281 31,829
c 10,694 3,665 1,863 34,095
hf 39.6 19.6 0 100
hm 38.6 19.4 0 89
lf 80.4 19.6 31 120
lm 81.4 19.4 20 120
choice variables, ind. tax.
cf 4,977 2,684 218 17,106
cm 6,049 3,132 291 29,784
c 11,026 3,906 1,863 33,527
hf 42.8 19.8 0 100
hm 40.7 19.6 0 89
lf 77.2 19.8 20 120
lm 79.3 19.6 31 120
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10 Appendix C: estimation of unitary model
Table C1: estimation results — no taxation
coefficient vector θˆ
o
parameter coef. s.e. t
βfιf1 (log lf × ιf1) 23.22 5.72 4.1
βfιf2 (log lf × ιf2) 15.56 5.69 2.7
βfιf3 (log lf × ιf3) 7.24 5.61 1.3
βmιm1 (log lm × ιm1) 14.30 6.58 2.2
βmιm2 (log lm × ιm2) 5.15 6.53 .8
βmιm3 (log lm × ιm3) -3.40 6.49 -.5
βc (log c) -49.92 10.76 -4.7
αff (log lf × log lf ) -17.59 .57 -31.0
αmm (log lm × log lm) -18.04 .61 -29.8
αcc (log c× log c) 1.51 .42 3.6
αfm (log lf × log lm) 25.39 .81 31.4
αfc (log lf × log c) 3.45 .44 7.9
αmc (log lm × log c) 5.23 .52 10.1
Table C2: estimation results — joint taxation
coefficient vector θˆ
c
parameter coef. s.e. t
βfιf1 (log lf × ιf1) -13.42 4.60 -2.9
βfιf2 (log lf × ιf2) -20.80 4.59 -4.5
βfιf3 (log lf × ιf3) -28.86 4.50 -6.4
βmιm1 (log lm × ιm1) 4.45 5.26 .8
βmιm2 (log lm × ιm2) -4.18 5.19 -.8
βmιm3 (log lm × ιm3) -12.47 5.13 -2.4
βc (log c) -68.71 2.45 -28.0
αff (log lf × log lf) -19.02 .64 -29.5
αmm (log lm × log lm) -20.17 .70 -28.8
αcc (log c× log c) 1.64 .07 25.1
αfm (log lf × log lm) 30.80 .96 32.1
αfc (log lf × log c) 6.39 .33 19.6
αmc (log lm × log c) 5.95 .37 15.9
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Table C3: estimation results — individual taxation
coefficient vector θˆ
p
parameter coef. s.e. t
βfιf1 (log lf × ιf1) -17.97 4.79 -3.7
βfιf2 (log lf × ιf2) -24.59 4.81 -5.1
βfιf3 (log lf × ιf3) -31.44 4.77 -6.6
βmιm1 (log lm × ιm1) -21.06 5.32 -4.0
βmιm2 (log lm × ιm2) -28.93 5.31 -5.4
βmιm3 (log lm × ιm3) -36.50 5.30 -6.9
βc (log c) -91.34 3.50 -26.1
αff (log lf × log lf ) -13.80 .52 -26.6
αmm (log lm × log lm) -15.01 .58 -25.7
αcc (log c× log c) 2.35 .09 26.5
αfm (log lf × log lm) 21.23 .73 29.2
αfc (log lf × log c) 6.22 .44 14.1
αmc (log lm × log c) 8.14 .49 16.6
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11 Appendix D: tax revenue
The first column of Table C shows the amount of tax revenue in the situ-
ations of joint and individual taxation, computed from the simulated data.
The small discrepancy between both figures could of course be eliminated
by adjusting, say, the tax brackets in the joint taxation situation. However
the subsequent columns show that this is of minor importance. For each
estimated parameter vector and for each fiscal system, we report the tax
revenue associated with the predicted labor market situation of each house-
hold. The misspecification associated with the unitary representation leads
to important discrepancies. In all cases the unitary model predicts substan-
tially larger tax revenues for joint taxation, whereas the actual tax revenue is
actually marginally lower than for individual taxation. This point is impor-
tant, because the evaluation of fiscal reforms often entails the specification
of revenue neutral reforms.
The fact that the worst predictions are obtained using θˆ
o
is not surprising,
since the introduction of taxation leads to large adjustments in labor supplies.
However it is slightly puzzling to find that the revenue for individual tax is
better predicted using θˆ
c
than θˆ
p
. No such reversal appears for joint taxation.
Another puzzle lies in the fact that tax revenues predicted using θˆ
c
and θˆ
p
are
larger than the actual tax revenue, since the unitary model leads to an under-
estimation of labor supplies (see Section 6.2). In fact. low levels of labor
supply are rather over-estimated and notably the number of participants is
overstated. But individuals with low labor supply have on average higher
unearned income and are thus more likely to be taxed.
Table C: tax revenues
model collective unitary
tax system θˆ
o
θˆ
c
θˆ
p
joint taxation 2,999,920 4,096,180 3,289,330 3,490,220
individual taxation 3,026,510 3,801,910 3,121,990 3,324,170
variation -.88% +7.74% +5.36% +5.00%
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